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CONSTITUTIONAL

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-DOUBLE

JEOPARDY-

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held
that where a trial judge sua sponte declares a mistrial without a
request for or consent to the declaration by the defendant's counsel,
the defendant does not waive a later claim of double jeopardy
despite his failure to timely and specifically object at the first trial
WAIVER-MISTRIAL-The

to the jury's discharge.
Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci, 362 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1976).
In 1973, Frank Bartolomucci was tried before a jury in the Mercer
County Court of Common Pleas on a narcotics charge.' After nearly

ten hours of deliberation following the trial, the jury had still not
reached a verdict. Believing the jury to be deadlocked, the court
held two conferences with both prosecuting and defense counsel
regarding a possible discharge of the jury. Although defense counsel
neither requested nor consented to it, the court declared a mistrial
and dismissed the jury.2 Bartolomucci's counsel made no specific

objection to the dismissal of the jury in the first trial. When the
Commonwealth attempted to re-try Bartolomucci, his counsel objected on the grounds that such a trial would place his client in
double jeopardy.3 This objection was overruled, and Bartolomucci
was convicted and sentenced after the second trial. The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, in a 5-2 decision, reversed the conviction,
stating that since the jury was improperly discharged in the first
trial, Bartolomucci's second trial violated the fifth amendment's
proscription against double jeopardy.4
1. The charge was based on a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30) (Purdon Supp. 19771978). Bartolomucci allegedly sold 15 methaqualone pills for the sum of $15.00. Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci, 362 A.2d 234, 236 n.2 (Pa. 1976).
2. The trial judge asked Bartolomucci's attorney whether he thought the jury should be
discharged. Bartolomucci's attorney requested that the jury be given additional instructions
concerning their responsibilities to consider each other's positions, and the right to retain
their own position. The judge denied the request and dismissed the jury. Id. at 241.
3. Id. at 237. In post-trial briefs after the second trial, Bartolomucci argued there was no
manifest necessity that the jury be dismissed in the first trial since the trial judge did not
ascertain whether the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. Absent the request or consent of the
defendant, manifest necessity is the only ground on which a state can re-try a defendant
without violating his double jeopardy right. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), cited
with approval in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
4. 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 559, 335 A.2d 747 (1975). Judge Cercone, speaking for the majority,
concluded that had the trial judge by personal communication with the jury determined that
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Rejecting the Commonwealth's waiver argument and the defendant's jurisdictional challenge, 5 a divided Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed. Despite the rule of Commonwealth v. Clair4 that
allegations of basic and fundamental error were not reviewable unless properly preserved by timely objection,7 counsel's failure to specifically object to the mistrial did not constitute a waiver to the
defense of double jeopardy.' Justice Eagen, writing for a majority
a unanimous verdict could not be reached, the jury could have been appropriately dismissed.
Id. at 563, 335 A.2d at 749.
5. The defendant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because it had entered an order
denying the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of an appeal on June 19, 1975, and
without the Commonwealth having petitioned for reconsideration of that order, had sua
sponte vacated the earlier denial order and granted the Commonwealth's petition. Bartolomucci contended that reinstating the Commonwealth's appeal after expiration of the ten-day
period for appeals rendered too great a hardship on persons who thought their cases were
finally adjudicated. Brief for Appellee at 6, Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci, 362 A.2d 234
(Pa. 1976). The supreme court dismissed this issue. It held that the order of June 19th was
made erroneously and that the court had inherent power to correct such administrative
mistakes. 362 A.2d at 237 n.2.
6. 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). See text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
7. See 362 A.2d at 238.
8. Id. at 238. Double jeopardy does not prevent reprosecution in every aborted trial. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that the public has an interest in fair trials which end in
just results. See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (military emergency precluding continuation of a trial justified calling a mistrial and re-trying defendant). The purpose
of double jeopardy is essentially to prevent the state from making repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a state of anxiety and insecurity. Repeated
trials would also increase his chances of being found guilty even though innocent. See, e.g.,
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (defendant initially tried for either first
or second degree murder and found guilty of second degree murder cannot be retried for first
degree murder on remand).
Prior to 1969, double jeopardy claims arising in Pennsylvania criminal proceedings were
controlled by PA. CONST. art. I, § 10, which states in part: "[N]o person shall, for the same
...
This provision was interpreted by the
offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
Pennsylvania courts as applicable only to capital offenses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker,
413 Pa. 105, 109-12, 196 A.2d 382, 384-86 (1964). In 1969, however, the United States Supreme
Court held that the fifth amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, and extended the prohibition to non-capital cases. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
In June of 1973, the new Pennsylvania Crimes Code became effective, providing statutory
guidance on when and how double jeopardy should apply. The Code provides:
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is based
upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution
under the following circumstances:
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated after the first witness was
sworn but before a verdict, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.
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of five, acknowledged that the supreme court's earlier decision in
Clair required specific objection to rulings and conduct of a trial
judge in order to have these questions reviewed on appeal. He also
conceded that the principle underlying Clair, giving the trial court
an opportunity to correct an error, would have been served had
defense counsel objected to the judge's discharge of the jury without
personally ascertaining that they were hopelessly deadlocked.' Nevertheless, due to the peculiar nature of the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy, in the court's view, Clairwas inapplicable.
Analyzing the substantive law of double jeopardy as recently reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Dinitz, o the Bartolomucci court read Dinitz as requiring that absent
a finding that the mistrial was manifestly necessary, a defendant
must either request or consent to a mistrial in order to negate a
double jeopardy claim."
Since failure to make a correct, specific objection could be
2 the majority
deemed a consent to the mistrial in Bartolomucci,1
concluded that the procedural rule of Clair and the substantive law
of double jeopardy as established by Dinitz were in conflict. Although "conceptually" there was no clash between the two, to find
that defendant's failure to object to the mistrial constituted a
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 109 (Purdon 1973). PA. R. CRIM. P. 1118(b) states that only a
defendant may move for a mistrial, absent manifest necessity. Hence, a sua sponte declaration of mistrial by the court bars retrial in the absence of the requisite "manifest necessity."
See Commonwealth v. Lauria, 450 Pa. 72, 297 A.2d 906 (1972). Rule 1118(b) was later limited
by interpreting manifest necessity as including a hung jury situation. In those circumstances,
a court could properly declare a mistrial. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Pa. 395, 301 A.2d
876 (1973). For a thorough discussion of the history of double jeopardy in Pennsylvania see
Belsky, Criminal Procedure in Pennsylvania: PretrialIssues, 78 DICK. L. REv. 209, 281-302
(1973).
9. 362 A.2d at 238.
10. 424 U.S. 600 (1976). See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
11. 362 A.2d at 238. The question in Dinitz was whether the double jeopardy clause had
been violated by the retrial of a defendant after his original trial had ended in a mistrial
granted at his request. Defendant's counsel had been prematurely ejected from the courtroom. The Supreme Court held that where the trial judge's banishment of defense counsel
was not done in bad faith, re-trying the defendant did not violate double jeopardy since the
defendant had requested the retrial. 424 U.S. at 611.
12. Justice Eagen stated:
[T]he substantive law of double jeopardy requires either a request or consent by a
defendant to the mistrial in order to avoid the requirement that the mistrial be manifestly necessary. A mere failure to state the reason for an objection or to make a correct
specific objection cannot be viewed as a request for or consent to the mistrial.
362 A.2d at 238.
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waiver would, according to the court, make that failure the functional equivalent of consent. 3 Functionally, then, Clair could not be
reconciled with the mandate of the double jeopardy clause in this
factual setting. The court therefore rejected invoking Clair's waiver
rule, carving out an exception to its heretofore unqualified application. 4
Once the court was satisfied the defendant had not waived his
double jeopardy claim, it considered the merits of the trial judge's
sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. The majority applied a strict
test of manifest necessity; 5 before a trial judge could order a
mistrial, he must determine that it is clearly necessary, based on a
careful and scrupulous evaluation of the circumstances." Since the
13. Id.
14. The court emphasized that because of the constitutional prohibition of the double
jeopardy clause, a sua sponte declaration of a mistrial absent manifest necessity was unlike
the majority of situations where Clair's requirements were strictly enforced. 362 A.2d at 238.
15. In the landmark case of United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), the
Supreme Court held that a jury's inability to reach a verdict was a proper basis for declaring
a mistrial and would not bar reprosecution, if a second trial were manifestly necessary. The
Perez Court, recognizing the impossibility of developing a rigid standard for mistrial, promulgated general guidelines for trial judges who, after weighing the conflicting individual and
state interests at stake, were to be cautious, scrupulous and discrete in declaring mistrials.
Id. at 580.
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), required greater appellate scrutiny of lower
court decisions involving mistrials. Jorn, cited by the Bartolomucci majority as embodying
the proper test of manifest necessity, requires a trial judge to consider procedural alternatives
and then decide whether a mistrial is manifestly necessary before it can be said that a trial
has been properly aborted. Id. at 487. The Supreme Court's more recent decisions, however,
indicate a departure from the strict Jorn standard; they allow the trial judge broad discretion
to declare a mistrial absent bad faith. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), which
held a reprosecution appropriate when a mistrial had been declared because of a fatally
defective indictment which could not be cured under Illinois law. The Court abjured the pure
manifest necessity test enunciated in Jorn. Id. at 465-71.
16. The majority's holding that the judge's failure to personally poll the jury rendered the
mistrial not manifestly necessary is in keeping with recent decisions of the Pennsylvania
courts which suggest that doubts as to the existence of manifest necessity must be resolved
in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Walton v. Aytch, 466 Pa. 172, 352
A.2d 4 (1976) (trial court's failure to attempt to contact defendant's counsel created doubt
as to necessity for mistrial); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 446 Pa. 24, 285 A,2d 189 (1971)
(where mistrial was granted on motion of Commonwealth and other viable alternatives existed, reprosecution barred). But see Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615,'337 A.2d 573
(1975) (judge's illness during trial constituted manifest necessity allowing mistrial).
For an opinion on the application of manifest necessity to the facts of Bartolomucci contrary to that of the majority, see Judge Van der Voort's dissent in the superior court decision,
232 Pa. Super. Ct. at 565-66, 335 A.2d at 750-51. Neither Justice Nix nor Justice Pomeroy,
the dissenters in the supreme court opinion, reached the merits of the issue of manifest
necessity, since they felt Bartolomucci's double jeopardy claim was not properly before the
court.
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judge had not personally polled the jury, the necessity of the
mistrial was doubtful; the Commonwealth had not met the manifest
necessity test. Bartolomucci's right not to twice be put in jeopardy
7
had been violated.'
Justice Nix dissented. He cited a spate of recent cases where
constitutional claims were not considered on appeal because, under
the procedural rule of Clair, they were waived at a particular stage
in the trial process." He argued that the majority had not presented
any reasons for making an exception to the Clair waiver doctrine for
double jeopardy claims." He also emphasized that a defendant in
Bartolomucci's position had an appropriate remedy: an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.'" Justice Nix observed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Bryant,2'
which involved a double jeopardy allegation, was directly on point.
The defendant there had failed to correctly and properly preserve
for appeal a double jeopardy claim, and the supreme court had held
22
the claim waived.
In a separate dissent, Justice Pomeroy pointed to the uniform
application of Clair since its inception, and the general desirability
of following a consistent tack.2 3 He believed the majority's decision
was founded on a perceived conflict between Clair and double jeop17. Justice Manderino joined the majority of Justices Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, and Chief
Justice Jones, but filed a separate concurrence. In his view, a claim of double jeopardy,
similar to a court's inquiry into its own subject matter jurisdiction, could be raised at any
time since no court has jurisdiction to try a person twice. 362 A.2d at 240 (concurring opinion).
To do so, in his view, would violate not only the Federal but the Pennsylvania Constitution
as well. Id.
18. 362 A.2d at 240-41 (dissenting opinion).
19. Id. at 241.
20. Id. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is one basis for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(c)(6) (Purdon Supp.
1977-1978). The standard used to judge an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was set forth
in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967), where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that counsel's assistance is effective if there is some
reasonable basis for his conduct. The court observed that the attorney's course chosen in a
particular situation is to be examined in light of all available alternatives, but the outcome
does not depend on whether the most reasonable alternative was taken. So long as there is
some reasonable basis for counsel's actions, his assistance will be deemed "effective." Id. at
604-05, 235 A.2d at 352-53. See generally Comment, Pennsylvania Waiver Doctrine in Criminal Proceedings: Its Application and Relationship to the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claim, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 217, 250-56 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Waiver].
21. 461 Pa. 309, 336 A.2d 300 (1975). See text accompanying notes 38 & 39 infra.
22. 461 Pa. at 313, 336 A.2d at 302.
23. 362 A.2d at 242 (dissenting opinion).
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ardy which did not exist; neither did the tension between the two
pose constitutional problems since the former was a procedural rule,
the latter, substantive law." He distinguished the Supreme Court's
holding in Dinitz on the ground that there, the Supreme Court was
referring to waiver not in the procedural sense of failing to preserve
an issue for appeal, but in the substantive sense of a knowing and
intelligent waiver of a constitutional right.2 5 Although he would welcome a move away from the constraints which Clair had placed on
the court in reviewing even fundamental trial errors, in Justice
under the facts in this case
Pomeroy's view, Clair was controlling
26
and should therefore be followed.

The central issue in Bartolomucciwas whether the defendant had
waived his right to invoke a double jeopardy defense by failing to
object on that ground at the first trial. It has been recognized as a
general rule of appellate procedure that questions not properly
raised or preserved at trial will not be considered for the first time
on appeal.2 This rule is based on the rationale that lower courts
would correct errors if they had the opportunity to do so, and that
defendants should be deterred from withholding objections solely to
assure a basis for a later appeal.28 It promotes administrative
efficiency, respect for the dignity of the trial courts, and finality of
judgments. 21 In 1968, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Williams 0 created an exception to the rule by adopting
the doctrine of basic and fundamental error. In special circum24. Id. at 243.
25. Id. Cf. text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
26. 362 A.2d at 243 (dissenting opinion).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A.2d 741 (1972) (failure to object
to introduction of inflammatory photograph as evidence waived right to appeal on that
ground); Commonwealth v. Delfino, 259 Pa. 272, 102 A. 949 (1918) (lack of objection to
improper remark made by prosecutor waived right to raise the objection on appeal); Commonwealth v. Polichinus, 229 Pa. 311, 78 A. 382 (1910) (failure to object to district attorney's
statement to defense witness waived rightto subsequently appeal conviction on that ground).
28. See Commonwealth v. Razmus, 210 Pa. 609, 60 A. 264 (1905) cited with approval in
Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 305 A.2d 14 (1973); Commonwealth v. Danzy, 225 Pa.
Super. Ct. 234, 310 A.2d 291 (1973) (party may not sit silent and later complain if decision is
adverse).
29. See Comment, Appeal of Errorsin the Absence of Objection-Pennsylvania's"Fundamental Error" Doctrine, 73 DiCK. L. Rlv. 496 (1968); Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1974, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 527, 712 (1975).
30. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968). Williams held that where defendant's life or liberty
is at stake, the general rule that an appellate court will not reverse on issues not properly
preserved is inapplicable.
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stances, the court could overlook a mistake or inadvertence of trial
counsel and review, on its merits, an unpreserved error which had
allegedly jeopardized the fairness of the defendant's trial. 3'
Six years after its decision in Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Clair2 eliminated the basic and
fundamental error doctrine in criminal cases. One reason for its
abrogation was the fact the doctrine had previously been eliminated
in civil cases. 33 More fundamentally, it encouraged silence as a defense strategy, allowing defense counsel to withhold objections to
assure a later ground for appeal.3 Furthermore, while the fundamental error rule acknowledged that all potentially reversible error
was not basic and fundamental, there was no readily apparent difference between that which was fundamental and that which was
not;35 this created uncertainty as to when the rule was properly
invocable. Despite claims that one of Clair's underlying premises-conserving judicial resources-was of questionable validity, 36
31. The supreme court stated that due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
is denied "where there is basic and fundamental error which affects the merits or justice of
the case, or. . . offends against the fundamentals of a fair and impartial trial. . . or deprives
a defendant of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.' " Id. at
563-64, 248 A.2d at 304.
32. 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974), noted in 13 DuQ. L. REv. 992 (1975).
33. Id. at 423, 326 A.2d at 272-73. See Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255,
322 A.2d 114 (1974) (doctrine of fundamental error inappropriate in civil cases). The court in
Dilliplaine reasoned that the doctrine disrouraged alert and adequate lawyer preparation,
penalized the opposing party, eliminated the trial court's opportunity to correct the error,
voided the finality of trial court holdings, and encouraged specious appeals. Id. at 257-59, 322
A.2d at 116-17. Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justices Eagen and O'Brien, dissented in Clair.
He opposed elimination of the fundamental error doctrine, arguing that it had evolved to
insure a basically fair trial to every defendant, many of whom had no choice in the selection
of their counsel. Because of the very nature of what is at stake-liberty as opposed to
money-he contended that criminal rules should not parallel rules of civil procedure. 458 Pa.
at 423-24, 326 A.2d at 275. (Pomeroy, Eagen, & O'Brien, JJ., dissenting). Justice Pomeroy
also took issue with the majority's position that elimination of the doctrine of fundamental
error was judicially economical. In his view, trial errors not reviewable on appeal would
resurface in post-conviction proceedings, in the form of claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.

Id. at 423-24, 326 A.2d at 275 (dissenting opinion). See also 13 DuQ. L. REv. 992, 997-98 (1975)
(questioning the validity of applying the Dilliplainerationale to Clair).
34. 458 Pa. at 421, 326 A.2d at 273.
35. Id.
36. Clair basically substitutes the claim of ineffectiveness of counsel for relief under the
fundamental error doctrine. While Clair therefore reduced claims of error on direct appeal,
the finality of a decision could still be attacked in collateral proceedings. Thus the cost of
administration of justice was not significantly reduced; but merely shifted from appellate to
trial courts and from one party, the state, to another, the defendant's counsel. See Pennsyl-
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claims of error on direct appeal have been consistently dismissed
when not properly preserved. Regardless of whether constitutional
issues are involved, the court has uniformly refused to review trial
errors notwithstanding the degree to which they affect the fairness
of the defendant's conviction.37
Bartolomucci was not the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's first
encounter with a claim of double jeopardy since its decision in Clair.
In Commonwealth v. Bryant,3" the defendant was convicted of murder in a second trial after a previous trial had resulted in a hung
jury. In post-verdict motions, he alleged only that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him. On appeal to the supreme court, the
defendant again argued insufficiency but further contended that the
second trial had violated his constitutional right not to be subjected
to double jeopardy. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously
agreed that the double jeopardy claim was not cognizable on appeal,
citing Clair.39 Surprisingly, the Bartolomucci majority made no reference to Bryant. If the cases are distinguishable at all, it is because
Bryant involved a failure to preserve a double jeopardy issue for
appeal, whereas Bartolomucci involved a failure to specifically object at trial. It is questionable, however, whether that distinction is
of any significance. Clairhas a preclusive effect in both instances,40
since failing to object at trial forecloses raising the alleged error on
appeal. In any event, it is disturbing that the majority did not
consider Bryant in view of its apparent inconsistency with the result
in Bartolomucci.
The majority's use of a functional analysis, a somewhat novel
approach to the waiver of constitutional rights, purportedly explicates the majority's qualification of Clair and its apparent departure from Bryant. According to Justice Eagen, determining that
Bartolomucci had waived his double jeopardy claim would have the
same effect as finding that he had consented to the mistrial. Since
consent is one basis upon which the state can re-try a defendant, 4
vania Waiver, supra note 20; 13 Duq. L. Rv. 992, 998-1002. See also 458 Pa. at 423-24, 326
A.2d at 275 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
37. See 362 A.2d at 240-41 (Nix, J., dissenting).
38. 461 Pa. 309, 336 A.2d 300 (1975).
39. Id. at 313, 336 A.2d at 302.
40. Compare Commonwealth v. Bryant, 461 Pa. 309, 336 A.2d 300 (1975) (waiver of
alleged double jeopardy claim), with Commonwealth v. Jones, 460 Pa. 713, 334 A.2d 601
(1975) (waiver of alleged unconstitutionally obtained confession).
41. See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972) (mistrial with defen-
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Bartolomucci could then be re-tried without violating the double
jeopardy clause. This approach is deceptively simple, and at first
glance appears tenable. On closer analysis, however, the court's
functional analysis is difficult to defend.
Analogizing waiver of other constitutional rights crystallizes this
difficulty. For example, whereas a defendant waives a double jeopardy claim by consenting to a mistrial, an accused can relinquish a
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by knowingly and
willingly waiving that right."2 In the fifth amendment situation, the
defendant might confess to a particular crime without making such
a waiver, yet, if at trial his confession is introduced into evidence
and he does not object to its introduction, that right is relinquished.
This failure to object has exactly the same effect as if the accused
had intelligently waived his fifth amendment right before making
the confession: the right is extinguished. Yet in contrast to its refusal to apply Clairin a double jeopardy situation, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has applied the Clair waiver doctrine to fifth
amendment claims. 3 The Bartolomucci court may have focused sub
silentio on the requirement that there be consent to a mistrial to
vitiate a double jeopardy claim, as opposed to other rights which
require a knowing waiver in order to be foreclosed. Arguably, however, requiring that a defendant consent to a mistrial has the same
effect as requiring the defendant to waive any right to raise a double
jeopardy claim at the second trial; thus the double jeopardy criterion and the test for waiver of other constitutional rights are at
least theoretically identical. A true functional analysis of a double
jeopardy situation therefore supports, rather than undermines, the
view that this constitutional right should be treated no differently
than any other.
The majority's other justifications for departing from Clair are
also unpersuasive. The court's distinguishing of double jeopardy as
dant's consent, or even without consent in extraordinary fact situations, will permit reprosecution).
42. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) (privilege against self-incrimination
may be waived in appropriate circumstances if knowingly and voluntarily waived). The
"knowing and intelligent" standard for waiver of constitutional rights was first enunciated
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel).
43. Commonwealth v. Tressler, 461 Pa. 240, 336 A.2d 265 (1975) (waiver of alleged violation of Mirandarights); Commonwealth v. Jones, 460 Pa. 713, 334 A.2d 601 (1975) (waiver of
alleged unconstitionally obtained confession).
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distinct from the other constitutional claims to which Clairhas been
applied purportedly finds support in United States v. Dinitz.44
There the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by the retrial of the defendant after his
original trial had ended in a mistrial granted at his request." As the
Bartolomucci majority conceded, however, Dinitz involved double
jeopardy in a different context than Bartolomucci. Whereas
Bartolomucci involved a judicially imposed procedural rule and
considered whether it could have preclusive effect, Dinitz turned on
whether there had been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
defendant's double jeopardy right. 6 Furthermore, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that constitutional due process rights, rights which can affect the very fairness of a defendant's
trial, can be waived in some circumstances if not raised at trial. 7
The majority's reliance on the fifth amendment's prohibition of sua
sponte declarations of mistrials absent manifest necessity" also
seems unsupportive of Bartolomucci's retrenchment from Clair.
The Federal Constitution prohibits trying defendants without giving them an opportunity to confront witnesses, as well as denying
persons equal protection of the laws. Yet those are just two examples
of the variety of constitutional claims which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to review through invocation of the Clair
doctrine." The Bartolomucci court did not explain why one constitutional prohibition should be treated differently than others for
purposes of waiver.
Since Bartolomucci is certain to create speculation as to whether
the supreme court will further erode Clair,it may be significant that
the court arguably had an alternative method of hearing Bartolomucci's double jeopardy claim. In Commonwealth v. Fredericks,0
44. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
45. Id. at 611-12.
46. See 362 A.2d at 243 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
47. See cases cited at 362 A.2d at 240-41 (Nix, J., dissenting); id. at 242 n.2 (Pomeroy,
J., dissenting).
48. 362 A.2d at 238.
49. Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 55, 337 A.2d 873 (1975) (right to confront witness); Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d 845 (1974) (equal protection claim).
50. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 78, 340 A.2d 498 (1975). In Fredericks,the defendant was convicted
of burglary in a second trial and contended his double jeopardy rights were violated. The
superior court focused on the issue of whether the appellant could raise the bar of double
jeopardy at his second trial when he did not object to the court's sua sponte declaration of a
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the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in deciding a burglary case, held
it is not the unnecessary declaration of the mistrial which offends a
defendant's constitutional rights, but rather his subsequent prosecution for the same offense." There is always the possibility that
upon declaring a mistrial the state will choose not to reprosecute the
defendant and drop the charges.5" It therefore may be somewhat
harsh to require a defendant to object at the time of the declaration
of a mistrial when a subsequent trial may not occur. Under a
Fredericks approach, the second trial and not the aborted first trial
would be the proper place to raise a double jeopardy objection. In
Bartolomucci, counsel did object to the retrial on double jeopardy
grounds in both post-trial motions and on direct appeal;53 therefore,
the supreme court could have found this objection sufficient to preserve the defendant's double jeopardy claim.54 It is not certain
whether the majority simply never considered this possibility or
instead ignored it, seeing Bartolomucci as an opportunity to make
an initial inroad into Clair.
Examining waiver in terms of the substantive law of the right
assertedly waived, rather than the procedural aspect of the waiver
rule, represents a radical departure from the past approaches to
appellate review and has a potentially disruptive effect on a heretomistrial at his first trial. In the court's view, he could. The Bartolomucci majority cited
Fredericks as being in accord with its result, yet disposed of Bartolomucci on an entirely
different ground. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
51. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. at 85, 340 A.2d at 502. See also Commonwealth v. Coleman, 235
Pa. Super Ct. 379, 382, 341 A.2d 528, 530 (1975) (proper manner to preserve claim of improper
granting of mistrial is to object prior to the commencement of the second trial); Note, Mistrial
and Double Jeopardy, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 937, 948-49 (1974).
52. The court in Fredericksobserved:
[I]t is well known that the Commonwealth, having once been stymied at a jury trial,
frequently will not reprosecute when a relatively minor felony is involved. If the Commonwealth may wish to make a second effort at a conviction, it is the Commonwealth
which should insure that the court does not declare a mistrial unless manifest necessity
requires it. For, it is the Commonwealth which in fact has lost the case if the court
erroneously grants a mistrial.
235 Pa. Super. Ct. at 85-86, 340 A.2d at 502.
53. Bartolomucci's counsel first raised a double jeopardy objection to the retrial in his
post-trial briefs at the second trial. 362 A.2d at 237.
54. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now resolved this issue. In Commonwealth v.
Peters, 373 A.2d 1055 (Pa. 1977), the court held that failure to raise a double jeopardy claim
prior to commencement of the second trial constitutes a waiver of that right. In deciding
Peters, the supreme court preserved Bartolomucci; a defendant's failure to object when the
trial court declares a mistrial sua sponte will not amount to a waiver of his right not to twice
be put in jeopardy.
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fore certain judicial rule of procedure." If the Bartolomucci court
intended to set aside Clair only in the limited area of double jeopardy, their explanation as to why double jeopardy is more
"substantive" than other constitutional claims seems unpersuasive.
Any tension existing between the substantive law of double jeopardy
and the procedural rule of Clair also exists for other constitutional
issues. It will remain for future court decisions to determine whether
double jeopardy really involves unique considerations or whether
Bhrtolomucci suggests a rethinking by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court of both the scope and impact of Clair.
Margaret L. McArdle
55. Justice Pomeroy lamented the "state of unavoidable uncertainty" into which
Bartolomucci will plunge Pennsylvania's appellate courts. 362 A.2d at 244 (dissenting opinion).

